Business groups are an important aspect of the industrial organization of many developing countries. This paper develops a theory suggesting that they may be organizations that facilitate economic development in the presence¯nancial market constraints.
Introduction
A common thread in the industrial organization of developing countries is the absence of uniformity. The institutional infrastructure | legal,¯nancial and physical, that underpins the e±cient functioning of developed economies is either absent or inadequate in developing countries. The precise composition of these de¯ciencies varies from country to country. One way to interpret the considerable cross-country diversity in industrial organization is in terms of country-speci¯c responses to the pattern of institutional inadequacy. In this paper we gird one aspect of this diversity in industrial organization | the presence of diversi¯ed business groups | within a theoretical framework.
With this as the leitmotif, we develop a theory suggesting that business groups may be organizations that facilitate economic development in the presence of institutional | especially¯nancial market, constraints.
Diversi¯ed business groups are a feature of the organizational landscape of most developing countries (See Table 1 The two commonly forwarded explanations are: a) Group structures are 1 For example, the House of Tata in India has interests in steel, watches, detergents, tea, automobiles, and computer software. Grupo Luksic of Chile has interests in banks, hotels, mining, beer and pasta. Grupo Carso of Mexico has¯rms in telecoms, internet services, retail and¯nance. See \When eight arms are better than one," The Economist, Sept. 12, 1998, pp. 67-68. privately economical responses to avoidable policy distortions and political in°uence. b) Groups are economically valuable responses to failings in basic institutional infrastructure. Their scale and scope allow them to replicate the functions provided by stand-alone institutions in advanced economies (See Pankaj Ghemawat and Tarun .
We are concerned with the second set of explanations. This is because of the following empirical conundrum. Many developing countries have been in the process of transition towards more transparent market-driven environments, implying reduced policy distortions and scope for political patronage.
According to the¯rst set of reasons, this ought to be accompanied by a decrease in the dominance of groups. But on the contrary, in countries for which studies have been done, business groups appear to have emerged from the policy changes with greater vigor. Speci¯cally, in a recent study that looks at India and Chile before and after liberalization, Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu (1999)¯nd an increase in group scope, an increase in the strength of social and economic ties that bind together group¯rms, an increase in self-reported market intermediation attempts by the groups and some evidence of improvement in pro¯tability of group a±liates
2 .
An important function of the stockmarket is as a vehicle for the diversi¯cation of risk. Since entrepreneurs are risk averse, the existence of a
2 Providing a precise de¯nition of a business group is tricky, because there can be subtle di®erences across countries, but Mark Granovetter (1994) has made the suggestion that \A business group is a collection of¯rms bound together in some formal and/or informal ways." The emphasis is on \...an intermediate level of binding | excluding, on the one hand, a set of¯rms bound merely by short-term strategic alliances and, on the other, a set of¯rms legally consolidated into a single one." Since our objective here in not to explain the ownership structure of the business group, we are content to accept this de¯nition and the existence of business groups that goes with it.
well functioning stockmarket encourages them to invest in specialized, albeit risky productive activities. But the establishment of a stockmarket has a public good character associated with it. There is therefore a coordination problem leading to the possibility of multiple equilibria: either the stockmarket takes o® with all entrepreneurs listing their¯rms on it, or there is no stockmarket (See Marco Pagano (1993) for a formal model). If there are serious obstacles to the free°ow of information in the economy, solving the coordination problem will be di±cult, making the second possibility especially likely. Overcoming informational asymmetries and thence solving the multilateral stockmarket coordination problem can be quite costly. On the other hand, the coordination costs associated with forming bilateral links between¯rms may be smaller. Because of this it may be more attractive for an entrepreneur to form bilateral links between his¯rm and a number of other¯rms and engage in risk sharing with them than to become part of the stockmarket. A set of such intra-¯rm links is what we call a business group. We¯nd that it may be possible for business groups to emerge when a stockmarket cannot.
The coordination problems arising from the existence of informational asymmetries are particularly serious for many developing countries because of the absence of specialized¯nancial intermediaries that perform monitoring services, or with the lack of skills and incentives of such intermediaries that do exist 3 . As economic development proceeds, more and better quali¯ed¯nancial intermediaries emerge, leading to smaller information costs.
This eventually enables well functioning stockmarkets to develop. In fact, a strong positive correlation between indices of stockmarket development and indices of¯nancial intermediary development has been well established by
Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, (1996) . In order to make case for robustness, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine construct a number of di®erent indices of stockmarket and¯nancial intermediary development. Depending on how these indices are de¯ned, the correlation lies between 0.62 and 0.92.
Our model enables us to envisage a number of di®erent scenarios that correspond to stages in the process of economic development. If informational problems in the economy are severe, neither a stockmarket nor business groups are feasible, in which case the economy will be stuck with a safe but unproductive technology. We label this situation the traditional economy. The shift to a productive, but risky technology is what we term Examples of traditional production are cottage production and agriculture. An example of modern production is industrialized factory production.
observed at all in this scenario.
We are most interested in the second scenario. We examine conditions under which business groups are preferable to the stockmarket. We are also able to derive the optimal size of the business group. Matching the empirical riddle that we alluded to earlier, we¯nd that as the economy modernizes, either through a reduction in informational costs or as more¯rms enter the economy, the business group actually expands in size, before¯nding itself abruptly rendered obsolete by the stockmarket.
The model has the following elements. Risk averse entrepreneurs can choose between two technologies, one of which is highly productive though risky (modern), while the other has a low level of productivity but is safe We use a simple spatial framework to formalize the information costs associated with link formation. This is a natural way to think of link formation, and the notion of`distance' is a ready metaphor for the costs of link formation. Such a setting also seems appropriate given the importance of networks, connections and ties of kinship in surmounting informational problems in countries with poor formal infrastructure 5 .
Our paper is related to the growing literature on¯nancial markets and economic development 6 . The two papers we feel are closest to our context are by Gilles Saint-Paul (1992) and by Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti (1997). Saint-Paul's paper formalizes the link between the adoption of specialized, more productive but risky technology and diversi¯cation opportunities. In the absence of well developed¯nancial markets, agents may limit risk by choosing less specialized and less productive technologies.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti enrich the argument by recognizing that specialized investments involve large sunk costs and that poor countries su®er from capital constraints. Therefore poor countries are either destined to remain poor, or rely on good exogenous shocks (lucky draws) and cross the development threshold by chance and are susceptible to variability. We suggest business groups may be another way out for poor countries. We discuss this issue and related policy implications in greater detail in section 6 of the paper
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the modeling framework. Section 3 sets up the payo®s under di®erent technology choice and risk diversi¯cation organizations. Section 4 then uses these scenarios to understand when modernization will occur and whether the facilitating organization will be the stockmarket or business groups. Section 5 considers the e®ects of changes in market concentration with exogenous and endogenous 5 For theoretical work on this issue see Rachel Kranton (1996) and Raja Kali (1999 information costs. Section 6 discusses the policy and empirical implications of the theory and concludes.
The Model
This section describes the theoretical framework that will be the vehicle for subsequent analysis. [ Figure 1 should be about here]
Spatial Di®erentiation and Link Formation
The spatial di®erentiation of¯rms is a metaphor for the information 7 We wish to have a formulation where greater proximity to other¯rms makes link formation easier and the cost to participating in the stockmarket is the same for all¯rms. The circle-radius metaphor is a simple setting that provides these features. For more general models of link formation, see Rachel Kranton and Deborah Minehart (1997) and Mathew Jackson and Asher Wolinsky (1996) .
Section 5 considers the endogeneity of information costs to the number of¯rms in the economy.
asymmetries that exist between them and could be based in product heterogeneity or geographic and social distance.
Preferences and Technology
Agents are risk averse and possess the quadratic utility function u(w) = w ¡ [(E(w)) 2 +V ar(w)]:
Stockmarkets and Business Groups
There are two organizations that¯rms can establish in order to diversify risks: a stockmarket or a business group.
Since we are concerned only with its risk diversi¯cation capabilities, a stockmarket is de¯ned as an organization in which pro¯ts of all the¯rms that are members are pooled and then shared through dividends. The stockmarket is located at the centre of the circle along the circumference of which¯rms are located. Establishing links with the stockmarket is costly.
This cost is represented by the distance between a¯rm and the centre of the circle. Since the stockmarket is located at the centre, the cost of becoming a member is the same for all¯rms and is r, the radius of the circle.
Alternatively, a¯rm can diversify risks by establishing links with a set of rms along the circle. The set of¯rms that¯rm i has direct links with is referred to as a business group. A business group engages in pro¯t sharing.
We assume that intra-group pro¯t sharing is equiproportionate in the following way. If¯rm i has direct links with M¯rms, then the dividend that i disburses to each member of the group is
Establishing links between¯rms is costly, as outlined above. If the distance between two¯rms who form a link is x, the total cost of this link is
x. The cost of this bilateral link is split evenly. Each¯rm therefore bears the cost
Timing
The timing of events is as follows:
Morning:
An entrepreneur chooses between the two technologies:
(T): Safe, but low productivity.
(M): Risky, but high productivity.
Afternoon:
An entrepreneur's actions at this stage depend on the choices made in the morning. If the choice was (M), the entrepreneur decides on an organization for risk diversi¯cation, i.e., either to join the stockmarket or to form a business group. The relevant transactions costs are incurred. If the choice was (T), the entrepreneur simply engages in production. The production process takes place at this stage.
Evening:
Returns from production are realized. Dividends are disbursed to shareholders. Consumption of returns takes place.
Stockmarkets and Business Groups
There are a number of di®erent scenarios that can emerge based on the framework described above. These are:
(A) Modern technology | Stockmarket | Consumption.
(B) Modern technology | Business Group | Consumption.
(C) Traditional technology ||| Consumption.
In this section we evaluate the payo®s from each of these scenarios.
Scenario A
Firm i evaluates whether to join the stockmarket given the choices of other¯rms that have decided to join. Suppose n ¡ 1 other¯rms are in the stockmarket. If i joins, the stockmarket will be constituted of n¯rms.
Total stockmarket pro¯ts will then be
y i . The dividend that each member receives in the¯nal period will be d
The information cost associated with being a member is r: So the¯nal period net expected utility will be [see the Appendix for details on this derivation],
Note that if a stockmarket is worthwhile for a subset n µ N of¯rms, it is worthwhile for all the¯rms. Therefore if a stockmarket emerges at all, it will contain all N¯rms 9 . Because of this, in what follows we evaluate the payo® from a stockmarket containing N¯rms, i.e.,
Scenario B
Let c(i : j) denote the cost to i of a bilateral link with¯rm indexed j.
Then,
Since a¯rm will seek to minimize on the costs of link formation, links will be formed in a symmetrical fashion on either side of i. Thus, the di®erence between the number of links on the right and left of i will be no greater than 
If¯rm i has bilateral links with g ¡ 1 other¯rms then it splits its pro¯ts evenly with all the¯rms, including itself. The dividend that each of thesē rms receives from i in the¯nal period is thus d 
+1
+ 10 As remarked upon earlier, if there is asymmetry, it will be to the maximum extent of one. The analysis will need to be modi¯ed, but the change is not substantive and does not gain any new insights. We therefore proceed with the even number assumption. 
or,
where we use ¼ to stand for the ratio of the circumference to the radius of the circle. We can use expression (2) to¯nd the optimal size of the group.
The value of g at which U B is maximized is 11 , 
Scenario C
If the entrepreneur chooses the traditional technology, there is nothing to be gained from diversi¯cation. Consequently,¯nal period pro¯t is simply y i =°k; for all i: Final period expected utility is,
11 It is easy to verify that the second derivative is negative. Note also that since the number of links is an integer, we will take the closest integer value to g ¤ :
If we di®erentiate the¯nal period payo®s in scenarios A and B with respect to information costs, we obtain,
This implies that if information costs increase, the returns from both stockmarkets and business groups fall. Furthermore, if
< 1 then the returns from stockmarkets fall faster. This is actually a necessary (but not su±cient) condition for the payo® with a business group to be greater than those with a stockmarket, i.e.,
It is therefore useful to label it for subsequent reference as follows:
Since the optimal size of the business group g ¤ is determined from basic parameters of the economy, A1 is essentially a condition requiring that business groups are`small' relative to the number of¯rms in the economy.
If A1 is violated a business group will never be preferred to a stockmarket.
Because the business group is the focus of our inquiry, in the next section we assume A1 holds. The analysis is straightforward when A1 is violated and we discuss this situation at the end of the following section.
Modernization
We now analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium in technology and organization choice. An entrepreneur's technology and organization choice in the morning will be based on the expected payo® that the di®erent scenarios yield in the evening.
Equating the payo® from the business group with that from the stock-
Call this value r ¤ : This represents the level of information costs at which an entrepreneur is indi®erent between a business group and a stockmarket.
We will use e r to refer to the prevailing value of information costs in the economy in order to di®erentiate it from r ¤ .
It is useful, at this stage to graph the payo® functions U A ; U B and U C .
There are two possibilities, depending on whether U C is greater than or less than U (r ¤ ): Figures 2 and 3 depict these two situations.
[ Figures 2 and 3 should be about here]
Modernization through the stockmarket: Figure 2 Consider a situation where the indi®erence point between stockmarkets and business groups corresponds to a higher level of utility than that obtainable under traditional technology, i.e., U C > U (r ¤ ):
As the prevailing value of information costs fall, say because of developments in¯nancial intermediation, at some point it becomes worthwhile to switch from the traditional sector to the industrialized sector. This takes place at the point where U C = U A , i.e.,
In this case the transition is from the traditional economy to the modern economy directly through the adoption of stockmarkets.
Modernization through business groups: Figure 3 Consider a situation where the indi®erence point between stockmarkets and business groups corresponds to a lower level of utility than that obtainable under traditional technology, i.e., U C < U (r ¤ ):
In this case, the transition is from the traditional economy to the modern economy through the establishment of business groups, at the point where
However, as we move to lower levels of information costs, at r ¤ stockmarkets become preferable and the business group is abruptly rendered obsolete. r B de¯nes the minimal size of the business group, through the function g ¤ (equation (3)). Since g ¤ is decreasing in r, as r falls, say because of developments in¯nancial intermediation, we¯nd that business groups actually expand in size before¯nally becoming obsolete at r ¤ : Maximal group size is thus de¯ned by g ¤ (r ¤ ):
The intuition for this is that, as information costs fall, business groups are able to incorporate more¯rms, thereby improving the bene¯ts they yield from diversi¯cation. The stockmarkets of course enables the greatest diversi¯cation, but the coordination costs involved are still larger than these bene¯ts until the coordination costs fall su±ciently.
It is useful to summarize the preceding analysis in the form of the following propositions.
Proposition 1:
Under (A1) and U C > U (r ¤ ) the economic transition to modernization takes place directly through the emergence of a stockmarket: If prevailing information costs cross r
], entrepreneurs adopt modern technology and diversify their risks through the stockmarket.
Proposition 2 (a):
Under (A1) and U C < U (r ¤ ) the economic transition to modernization takes place through the emergence of business groups: If prevailing informa-
], entrepreneurs adopt modern technology and diversify their risks through a business group.
Proposition 2 (b):
Under (A1) and U C < U (r ¤ ); after the economic transition to modernization through the emergence of business groups has taken place, a further reduction in prevailing information costs increases the size of the business group until they are abruptly rendered obsolete by the stockmarket: Holding the prevailing level of information costs in the economy (e r)¯xed, if r ¤ rises su±ciently until it equals e r, business groups will be rendered obsolete, with the stockmarket emerging as preferred instead.
Notice that We can state the previous analysis in terms of the following proposition.
Proposition 3:
If we hold¯xed the prevailing level of information costs (e r), and if the initial number of¯rms in the economy is small, an decrease in market concentration is accompanied by an increase in the size of the business group before the business group is abruptly rendered obsolete by the stockmarket. 
Violation of A1
When condition A1 is violated, U B < U A : Business groups will never be preferred to the stockmarket. As information costs fall, the economic transition is from a traditional economy to a modern economy through the emergence of a stockmarket. Figure 5 depicts this situation.
Discussion
In the presence of serious information problems it may be di±cult for a wellfunctioning stockmarket for the diversi¯cation of risk to emerge. Because the shift to modern, high productivity technology is risky, the economy may consequently remain trapped with its traditional low-productivity methods of production. In such a situation, the formation of a business group, and the risk sharing that goes with it, may be one means of escape. Precisely because informational problems may be more manageable at a bilateral level between¯rms, business groups can be organizations that facilitate modernization when the stockmarket cannot.
A stockmarket, of course a®ords much better risk sharing on account of its scale than a business group. It would therefore be best if the economy could move to a situation where these groups are obsolete. Within the model, there are two ways this can happen. One is through the obvious improvement in institutional infrastructure that reduces informational asymmetries.
The way this operates is that it reduces the costs associated with joining the stockmarket. This eases the coordination problem associated with the stockmarket, enabling it to take o®. A second path is through an increase in the number of¯rms in the economy. More¯rms increase the attractiveness of both the stockmarket and the business group, but in di®erent ways.
An increase in¯rm density in the economy implies lower information costs in bilateral link formation. It is easier to form and sustain larger groups. However, the scale of diversi¯cation obtainable from a full-°edged stockmarket increases, and these bene¯ts eventually tip the balance in its favor.
Because the bene¯ts of a business group improve with an increase in the number of¯rms in the economy, we obtain the somewhat surprising result that business groups actually expand in size and bene¯ts before abruptly being rendered obsolete by a full-°edged stockmarket. We¯nd that this also happens if infrastructure improves to reduce information costs, though for a slightly di®erent reason. A reduction in the costs of link formation makes it easier to form links with more¯rms that constitute the business group, improving its diversi¯cation possibilities. However, at some critical level of costs it is worthwhile to go all the way and form a stockmarket instead.
Realistically, the scale of a business group will always be much smaller Keeping to the model of this paper, a business group is not coalitionproof 13 . This implies that since the¯rms can freely communicate with each other, once the stockmarket emerges as a more e±cient organization we should observe a wholesale shift to the stockmarket.
But from a political economy perspective, it is important to realize that even when a business group has become obsolete it may fail to disappear from the organizational landscape. The theory in this paper has kept to purely economic arguments 14 , but vested interests and political patronage may play a role in their persistence. If business groups continue they may retard the functioning of the stockmarket. There is empirical evidence that in many 13 See B. Douglas Bernheim, Bezalel Peleg and Michael D. Whinston (1987). 14 There can be, of course, other economic functions that business groups perform. In situations with imperfect markets for labor and capital, networks are able to act as surrogate labor markets and venture capitalists. Further theoretical work will try to explicitly account for these functions.
developing countries, stockmarkets, such as they do exist, are atrophied, with limited°otation and few¯rms listed (See Gonzalo Castañeda (1998) for the Mexican case and Katherina Pistor (1999) for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). To this end, we feel that the rich set of con¯gurations described in the paper provides a foundation for interesting empirical work in this area.
This brings us full circle to the¯rst set of (political) arguments that we presented in the introduction about the existence of business groups and that we chose not to focus on in the paper. Perhaps radical reform in the legal sphere, such as has been proposed in some countries with regards to corporate governance and minority shareholder rights will provide the momentum to overcome these forces.
Then, 
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